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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant 
to Article VIII, Section 3, Constitution of Utah, Section 78-2-
2(j), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended and Rules 3(a) and 
4(a), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The following issues are presented for review: 
1. Did the trial court error in granting defendant's 
Motion for Reconsideration. 
2* Did the trial court error in denying plaintiff's Motion 
to Reopen Case for Limited Purpose? 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1, In reviewing the trial court's decision granting 
defendant's Motion for Reconsideration, the appellate court will 
accord no deference to the trial court's decision and review it 
for correctness since it was decided on an issue of law. Scharf 
v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985) (" [W] e accord 
conclusions of law no particular deference but review them for 
correctness/') ; Handy v. Union Pacific Railroad, 841 P.2d 1210, 
1215 (Utah App. 1992) (whether a party has failed to establish a 
prima facie case is a question of law); See also Sorenson v. 
Kennecott-Utah Copper Corp., 873 P.2d 1141, 1144 (Utah App. 
1994). 
2. In reviewing the trial court's decision denying 
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plaintiff's Motion to Reopen Case for Limited Purpose, the 
appellate court will grant deference to the trial court's 
decision. College Irrigation Company vs. Logan River & 
Blacksmith Fork Irrigation Company, 780 P.2d 1241 (Utah 1989). 
ISSUES PRESERVED FOR APPEAL 
The foregoing issues were preserved for appeal in 
plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to defendant's Motion for 
Reconsideration and plaintiff's Motion to Reopen Case for Limited 
Purpose (R. 261, 263). 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
J.V. Hatch Construction, Inc. ("Hatch Construction") filed a 
mechanic's lien against property owned by Michael Kampros 
("Kampros") and subsequently filed a Complaint to foreclose on 
that mechanic's lien. Pursuant to Section 38-1-7(3) Utah Code 
Annotated, plaintiff also mailed by certified mail a copy of that 
mechanic's lien within 30 days of recording to Michael Kampros. 
A bench trial was held and plaintiff was the prevailing party. 
At trial, plaintiff introduced evidence of the mechanic's lien 
but did not introduce evidence of mailing a copy of the 
mechanic's lien to defendant. Defendant never denied receiving 
the mailing and never raised the issue at trial or in his 
pleadings. In written Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 
the trial court awarded plaintiff its attorney's fees as the 
successful party pursuant to Section 38-1-18. The Court ruled 
2 
that evidence of failure to mail the mechanic's lien within 30 
days of recording by certified mail as required by Section 38-1-
7(3) was an affirmative defense that was never plead or alleged 
at trial by defendant. 
After the Court's ruling, defendant filed a Motion for 
Reconsideration urging the Court to reverse its decision that the 
mailing requirement was an affirmative defense and hold that 
proof of mailing pursuant to Section 38-1-7(3) was part of 
plaintiff's prima facie case to recover attorney's fees under 
Section 38-1-18. The effect of such a ruling would be to 
eliminate an award of attorney's fees to plaintiff since although 
the mailing occurred, plaintiff did not present evidence thereof 
at trial. In addition to opposing that motion, plaintiff filed a 
Motion to Reopen Case for the Limited Purpose of demonstrating 
that the mechanic's lien mailing requirement had been complied 
with. The trial court granted defendant's Motion for 
Reconsideration, reversed its prior ruling and held that proof of 
mailing was part of plaintiff's prima facie case, which plaintiff 
failed to prove at trial and therefore plaintiff was not entitled 
to attorney's fees. The court also denied Plaintiff's Motion to 
Reopen Case for the Limited Purpose of demonstrating that the 
mailing requirement had been complied with. Plaintiff brought 
this appeal from both of those rulings. 
> 
FACTS 
1. On August 31, 1995, J.v. Hatch Construction, Inc. filed 
a valid mechanic's lien on Michael Kampros' property. (R. 217.) 
2. On August 31, 1995, a copy of the mechanic's lien was 
mailed to Michael Kampros by certified mail, as required by 
Section 38-1-7(3). (R. 274-76.) 
3. On September 2, 1995, a Return Receipt for the 
certified letter was signed on behalf of Michael Kampros. (R. 
274-76.) 
4. On September 5, 1995, the Return Receipt was post 
marked for return mail to plaintiff's attorney. (R. 274-76.) 
5. In his answer to the Complaint and the Amended 
Complaint, defendant did not aver that the mailing did not occur. 
(R. 5-10, 56-67.) 
6. The matter was tried before Judge Hilder at a bench 
trial on August 12, 1996, September 11, 1996, November 8, 1996 
and December 3, 1996. (R. 211.) 
7. At trial, plaintiff did not introduce evidence that a 
copy of the mechanic's lien had been timely mailed to defendant, 
and the defendant did not introduce evidence that the mailing did 
not occur. (R. 217.) 
8. On July 31, 1997, the trial court ruled in plaintiff's 
favor on the Amended Complaint and ordered foreclosure of the 
mechanic's lien in the amount of $8,500. (R. 216-19.) 
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9. The Court also held that "compliance with the mailing 
requirement is not an element of plaintiff's claim. Any alleged 
non-compliance would constitute an affirmative defense, much like 
the statute of limitations or statute of frauds." (R. 217.) 
10. The Court held that plaintiff had "met the essential 
requirements of Section 38-1-18, thus creating prima facie proof 
of entitlement to attorney's fees." (R. 217-18.) 
11. Section 38-1-18 provides that the "successful party [in 
a mechanic's lien] action shall be entitled to recover a 
reasonable attorney's fee." 
12. On August 18, 1997, defendant filed a Motion for 
Reconsideration of Award of Attorney's Fees and Costs, urging the 
Court to reverse its previous ruling that plaintiff had proven a 
prima facie case of entitlement to attorney's fees under Section 
38-1-18. (R. 240.) 
13. Defendant cited Section 38-1-7(3), which provides that 
"failure to deliver or mail the notice of lien" precludes an 
award of attorney's fees, and argued that a prima facie case for 
the award of attorney's fees under Section 38-1-18 includes proof 
of mailing pursuant to Section 38-1-7(3). (R. 242-43.) 
14. Although plaintiff opposed that motion, plaintiff also 
filed a Motion to Reopen Plaintiff's Case for the Limited Purpose 
of proving that the mailing requirement had been complied with. 
(R. 268.) 
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15. A copy of the Return Receipt was attached to 
plaintiff's motion, together with an affidavit, affirming that a 
timely mailing had, in fact, occurred. (R. 274-76.) 
16. On October 27, 1997, the trial court granted 
defendant's Motion for Reconsideration, holding that proof of 
mailing under Section 38-1-7(3) was part of plaintiff's prima 
facie case to establish entitlement to attorney's fees under 
Section 38-1-18, which had not been proven at trial and therefore 
plaintiff was not entitled to attorney's fees. (R. 297-99.) 
17. On October 27, 1997, the trial court also denied 
plaintiff's Motion to Reopen Plaintiff's Case for Limited Purpose 
on the grounds that proof of the mailing was in plaintiff's 
possession at the time of trial. (R. 299-300.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court erred in holding that a prima facie case for 
attorney's fees under Section 38-1-18 includes proof of mailing 
under Section 38-1-7(3). The trial court also erred in denying 
plaintiff's Motion to Reopen Case for the Limited Purpose of 
demonstrating that the mailing requirement had been complied 
with. 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRORED IN GRANTING 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION. 
The trial court erred in granting defendant's Motion for 
Reconsideration on the grounds that A) plaintiff had established 
a prima facie case for attorney's fees under Section 38-1-18, B) 
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the Motion for Reconsideration were filed more than 10 days after 
the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law was entered, and C) 
the mailing did occur. 
A. A Prima Facie Case for Attorney's Fees Under Section 
38-1-18 Does Not Require Proof of Mailing Under Section 38-1-
7(3) . 
In granting defendant's Motion for Reconsideration, the 
trial court held that plaintiff had failed to prove a prima facie 
case for attorney's fees under Section 38-1-18, inasmuch as 
plaintiff had failed to prove that a copy of the mechanic's lien 
had been mailed to defendant by certified mail within 30 days of 
recording as required by Section 38-1-7(3). Section 38-1-18 
provides that attorney's fees "shall" be awarded to the 
"successful party" in mechanic's lien cases: 
In any action brought to enforce any lien 
under this chapter the successful party shall 
be entitled to recover a reasonable 
attorney's fee, to be fixed by the court, 
which shall be taxed as costs in the action. 
Utah Code Ann. Section 38-1-18. 
Plaintiff was the "successful party" in an action brought under 
"this chapter." Plaintiff filed a mechanic's lien, prevailed at 
trial, and the trial court entered a judgment foreclosing on the 
mechanic's lien in the amount of $8,500. 
A "prima facie case" is the minimum evidence sufficient to 
make a claim, until contradicted and overcome by other evidence. 
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See Binkowski v. Township of Shelby, 208 N.W.2d 243 (Mich. App. 
1973), see also State vs. Real Property at 633 East 640 North, 
Orem, 942 P.2d 925 (Utah 1997). A "prima facie case" for an 
award of attorney's fees pursuant to Section 38-1-18 requires 
only that the plaintiff prove that it was the "successful party" 
in an action to enforce a mechanic's lien. The claim that 
plaintiff has failed to comply with Section 38-1-7(3) is an 
"avoidance or affirmative defense" that defendant can raise, but 
is not part of plaintiff's prima facie case. 
Section 38-1-7(3) provides that within 30 days after filing 
a mechanic's lien, a copy of the mechanic's lien shall be mailed 
to the "reputed owner" or "record owner." Section 38-1-7(3) also 
provides that "failure to deliver or mail the notice of lien" to 
the "reputed owner" or "record owner" precludes an award of 
attorney's fees: 
Within 30 days after filing the notice lien, 
the lien claimant shall deliver or mail by 
certified mail to either the reputed owner or 
record owner of the real property a copy of 
the notice of lien. If the record owner's 
current address is not readily available, the 
copy of the claim may be mailed to the last-
known addresses appearing on the last 
completed real property assessment rolls of 
the county where the affected property is 
located. Failure to deliver or mail the 
notice of lien to the reputed owner or record 
owner precludes the lien claimant from an 
award of costs and attorney's fees against 
the reputed owner or record owner in an 
action to enforce the lien, (Emphasis Added) 
Utah Code Ann. Section 38-1-7(3). 
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In granting defendant's Motion for Reconsideration, the trial 
court held that, as a matter of law, a "prima facie" case for 
attorney's fees under Section 38-1-18 also includes proof of 
compliance with the Section 38-1-7(3) mailing requirement. 
As set forth below, a claim that Section 38-1-7(3) was not 
complied with is an "avoidance or affirmative defense" that may 
be raised by defendant, but is not an element of plaintiff's 
prima facie claim for attorney's fees under Section 38-1-18. 
There is no Utah case holding whether compliance with Section 38-
1-7(3) is one of the "elements" that must be proven to recover 
attorney's fees pursuant to Section 38-1-18. 
As a general rule, statutory defenses that negate a 
plaintiff's claim are defenses that may be raised by defendant, 
but are not part of plaintiff's prima facie case to establish a 
claim. For example, Section 25-5-4 Utah Code (statute of frauds) 
provides that certain "agreements are void unless the 
agreement... is in writing, signed by the party to be charged 
with the agreement." However, a prima facie case to recover on 
an agreement that falls within the statute of frauds does not 
include proving that the "agreement was in writing." Such a 
claim must be raised by way of affirmative defense. Phillips v. 
JCM Dev. Corp., 666 P.2d 876, 884 (Utah 1983) (the statute of 
frauds is an affirmative defense, not an element of the claim.) 
Similarly, Section 78-12-1 Utah Code (statute of 
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limitations) provides that "civil actions may be commenced only 
within the periods prescribed in this chapter..." However, a 
prima facie case for a cause of action subject to that chapter 
does not including proving that the cause of action was commenced 
within the periods prescribed in Title 78, Chapter 12. Such a 
claim must be raised by way of affirmative defense. Staker v. 
Huntington Cleveland Irrigation Co., 664 P.2d 1188, 1190 (Utah 
1983) (the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense, not 
an element of the claim.) 
Again, Section 63-30-3 Utah Code (governmental immunity) 
provides that "all governmental entities are immune from suit" 
with certain exceptions. However, a prima facie case to recover 
against a governmental entity does not require proving that one 
of the exceptions apply. The defendant must raise governmental 
immunity as an affirmative defense. Nelson vs. Salt Lake City, 
919 P.2d 568, 574 (Utah 1996) ("governmental immunity is an 
affirmative defense that must be proved by the defendant.")1 
In all of the above examples, a "prima facie case" does not 
include proving compliance with the cited statutes. Similarly, 
in this case, if plaintiff is "successful" on a claim filed under 
xOther examples could also be cited. For example, Section 
57-14-3 limits landowner liability for recreational accidents. 
However, a prima facie case for negligence does not include 
proving that the limitations of that chapter do not apply. 
Golding v. Ashley Central Irrigation Co., 793 P.2d 897 (Utah 
1990) (Section 57-14-1 et seq. is an affirmative defense, not an 
element of the claim.) 
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the mechanic's lien chapter, it has made a "prima facie case" for 
attorney's fees under Section 38-1-18. Defendant could have, but 
did not, raise failure to comply with Section 38-1-7(3) as an 
"avoidance or affirmative defense." 
The wording of Section 38-1-7(3) further indicates that 
noncompliance with the mailing requirement is a defense, not part 
of the prima facie case to establish attorney's fees under 
Section 38-1-18. That section provides that "failure to deliver 
or mail the notice of lien to the reputed owner or record owner 
precludes the lien claimant from an award of costs and attorney's 
fees." Worded in the negative, the language of the statute 
suggests that a defendant seeking to avoid liability for 
attorney's fees must raise that "failure" as a defense. Had the 
legislature intended a Section 38-1-7(3) mailing to be part of 
the prima facie case for attorney's fees under Section 38-1-18, 
Section 38-1-18 or 38-1-7(3) would have stated that claimants 
must comply with Section 38-1-7(3) to recover attorney's fees 
under Section 38-1-18. Being worded in the negative, the statute 
provides a defense, but is not part of the prima facie case for 
attorney's fees under Section 38-1-18. 
It is incumbent on the defendant to raise defenses "outside 
the scope of a [general denial] of plaintiff's prima facie case" 
that would prevent recovery. General Ins. Co. of America vs. 
Carnicero Dynasty Corp, 545 P.2d 502, 504 (Utah 1976). Rule 8 of 
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the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides the manner in which 
such an "avoidance or affirmative defense" may be raised. See 
Golding vs. Ashley Central Irrigation Co., 793 P.2d 897, 899 
(Utah 1990) (discussing the procedure for raising an "avoidance 
or affirmative defense" under Rule 8). Plaintiff is not required 
to rebut such defenses to establish a prima facie case. 
In this case, defendant did not claim in his pleadings or at 
trial that the mailing did not occur. Plaintiff's prima facie 
case for recovering attorney's fees under Section 38-1-18 did not 
include proving compliance with the Section 38-1-7(3) mailing 
requirement. Plaintiff was the "successful party" in a 
mechanic's lien case, which satisfied its prima facie case to 
recover attorney's fees under Section 38-1-18. The trial court 
errored in reversing its prior ruling and holding that 
plaintiff's prima facie case under Section 38-1-18 included proof 
of mailing under Section 38-1-7(3). 
B. The Motion For Reconsideration Was Improper. 
As a general rule, motions for reconsideration are not 
recognized in Utah. See Peay v. Peay, 607 P.2d 841 (Utah 1980); 
McKee v. Williams, 741 P.2d 978 (Utah 1981). There are two 
exceptions to this rule. First, where a trial court rules on 
less than all of the claims in a case, under Rule 54(b) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure the trial court may reconsider 
earlier rulings. See e.g., Timm vs. Dewsnup, 851 P.2d 1178 (Utah 
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1993). Second, where a motion for reconsideration is in 
substance a motion under Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, the motion to reconsider may be treated as a Rule 
59 motion. See e.g., Watkiss & Campbell v. Foa & Son, 808 P.2d 
1061 (Utah 1991). This case does not fall under either of those 
exceptions. 
Consequently, the trial court errored in reconsidering its 
earlier ruling. See Drury v. Lunceford, 415 P.2d 662 (Utah 1966) 
(a trial court does not have authority to act "as a court of 
review upon [its own] ruling.") Therefore, the trial court 
errored in considering defendant's motion for reconsideration 
where there was no basis to do so under Rule 54(b) or Rule 59 of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
C. The Mailing Did Occur. 
The Section 38-1-7(3) mailing requirement was complied with. 
The trial court errored in granting defendant's Motion for 
Reconsideration without also granting plaintiff's Motion to 
Reopen Case for Limited Purpose, to allow plaintiff to 
demonstrate proof of mailing. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION TO REOPEN FOR LIMITED PURPOSE. 
Inasmuch as the trial court granted defendant's Motion for 
Reconsideration, plaintiff should have been allowed to reopen its 
case for the limited purpose of demonstrating that, in fact, the 
mailing requirement was complied with. The trial court's 
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reversal of its prior ruling constituted a surprise to plaintiff. 
The trial court erred in denying plaintiff's Motion to Reopen for 
Limited Purposes on the grounds that A) plaintiff satisfied the 
Rule 59 grounds for reopening a case to take additional 
testimony, and B) the mailing did occur. 
A. Plaintiff complied with the requirements of Rule 59 for 
reopening the case. 
Plaintiff satisfied the grounds set forth in the Rule 59 of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to reopen this case for the 
limited purpose of demonstrating that the mailing requirement was 
complied with. Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
provides that the Court may "take additional testimony, amend 
findings of fact and conclusions of law or make new findings and 
conclusions" for a number of reasons, including 1) "[a]ccident or 
surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have guarded 
against," and 2) "[i]nsufficiency of the evidence to justify the 
verdict or other decision:" 
The court may open the judgment if one has been 
entered, take additional testimony, amend findings of 
fact and conclusions of law or make new findings and 
conclusions, and direct the entry of a new judgment 
[for any of the following causes]: 
• • • 
(3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary 
prudence could not have guarded against. 
(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify 
the verdict or other decision, or that it is 
against law. 
Rule 59(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
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Both of these grounds were satisfied in this case. At 
trial, the trial judge and plaintiff's counsel were of the 
opinion that plaintiff had proven a prima facie case for 
attorney's fees. It was not until defendant filed his Motion for 
Reconsideration, and the trial court reversed its prior ruling, 
that this changed. This is sufficient "accident or surprise" to 
justify plaintiff's introduction of evidence demonstrating 
compliance with the mailing requirement. Where the trial judge 
believed at trial that a prima facie case had been proven, 
certainly plaintiff was "surprised" when the trial judge later 
reversed his decision. "Ordinary prudence" could not have 
guarded against the trial judge later reversing his decision. 
Similarly, the trial court had awarded attorney's fees in 
its original Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. The trial 
court's later reversal created a "insufficiency of the evidence" 
to support its earlier award of attorney's fees. Since there was 
no evidence as to whether the mailing requirement had been 
complied with, the case should have been reopened under Rule 
59(a)(6) to determine whether there was sufficient evidence (i.e. 
proof of mailing) to support the trial court's earlier award of 
attorney's fees. 
B. The Mailing Pid QccuCt 
The trial court reconsidered its ruling as to whether proof 
of mailing was part of plaintiff's prima facie case, but denied a 
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motion to introduce evidence to demonstrate the truth of the 
matter. Mr. Kampros cannot have it both ways. If the trial 
court reconsiders the issue of what constitutes the prima facie 
elements of a claim and adds a new element, it is an abuse of 
discretion not to reopen the case to determine whether the new 
element (the mailing requirement) has been complied with. In 
this case, it is not disputed that the mailing requirement was 
complied with. Defendant knows that the mailing requirement was 
complied with. The trial court knows the mailing requirement was 
complied with. 
Once the trial court reversed its earlier ruling and added a 
new element, it was an abuse of discretion to deny plaintiff's 
Motion to Reopen for the Limited Purpose of demonstrating the 
truth of the matter—the mailing requirement was complied with. 
III. PLAINTIFF SHOULD BE AWARDED ITS 
ATTORNEY'S FEES ON APPEAL. 
As the prevailing party below, plaintiff should also be 
awarded its attorney's fees on appeal. See R & R Energies vs. 
Mother Earth Industries. Inc.. 936 P.2d 1068 (Utah 1997) (holding 
that where a party entitled to attorney's fees below prevails on 
appeal, an award of attorney's fees on appeal is proper). 
IV. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, this court should hold that 
proof of mailing under Section 38-1-7(3) is not part of 
plaintiff's prima facie case to establish a claim for attorney's 
fees under Section 38-1-18. Alternatively, this court should 
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hold that it was an abuse discretion for the trial court to grant 
defendant's Motion for Reconsideration but deny plaintiff's 
Motion to Reopen Case for the Limited Purpose of demonstrating 
that the mailing requirement had been complied with. This court 
should also award plaintiff its attorney's fees on appeal. 
DATED this <~ f day of March, 1998. 
lussell A. Cline 
Attorney for Appellant 
Michael W. Crippen, 
Attorney for Appellant 
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David Overholt 
Richer, Swan & Overholt 
6925 So. Union Park Center 
Suite 450 
Midvale, UT 84047 
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MECHANICS' LIENS 38-1-18 
38-1-17. Costs — Apportionment — Costs and attorneys' 
fee to subcontractor. 
Except as provided in Section 38-11-107, as between the owner and the 
contractor the court shall apportion the costs according to the right of the case, 
but in all cases each subcontractor exhibiting a lien shall have his costs 
awarded to him, including the costs of preparing and recording the notice of 
claim of lien and such reasonable attorneys' fee as may be incurred in 
preparing and recording said notice of claim of lien. 
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 1394; 
C.L. 1917, § 3744; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 52-1-
17; L. 1961, ch. 76, § 1; 1995, ch. 172, § 3; 
1996, ch. 79, § 56. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1995 amend-
ment, effective May 1, 1995, added "Except as 
provided in Section 38-11-107" at the beginning 
of the section. 
The 1996 amendment, effective April 29, 
1996, substituted "attorneys' fee" for "attorney's 
fee." 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Interest on judgment. 
In action to foreclose mechanic's lien and to 
recover for services rendered under contract of 
employment, it is not error to allow interest on 
sum awarded. Sandberg v. Victor Gold & Silver 
Mining Co., 24 Utah 1, 66 P. 360 (1901). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Attorney's Fees in 
Utah, 1984 Utah L. Rev. 553. 
Am. JUT. 2d. — 53 Am. Jur. 2d Mechanics' 
Liens § 461. 
38-1-18. Attorneys' fees. 
Except as provided in Section 38-11-107, in any action brought to enforce any 
lien under this chapter the successful party shall be entitled to recover a 
reasonable attorneys' fee, to be fixed by the court, which shall be taxed as costs 
in the action. 
History: R.S. 1898, § 1400; L. 1899, ch. 58, 
§ 1; C.L. 1907, § 1400; CJL 1917, § 3750; 
R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 52-1-18; L. 1961, ch. 76, 
§ 2; 1995, ch. 172, § 4. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1995 amend-
ment, effective May 1, 1995, added "Except as 
provided in Section 38-11-107" at the beginning 
of the section. 
Cross-References. — Attorneys' fee in suit 
for wages, § 34-27-1. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Appeals. 
Denial on excessive claim. 
Effect. 
Reduction by trial court. 
Successful party. 
Validity of lien. 
Cited. 
Appeals. 
An appeal from a suit brought to enforce a 
lien qualifies as part of "an action" for the 
purposes of this section. Richards v. Security 
Pac. Natl Bank, 849 P.2d 606 (Utah Ct. App.), 
cert, denied, 859 P.2d 585 (Utah 1993). 
Denial on excessive claim. 
Where it appears on trial that contractor has 
substantially performed his contract but that 
he attempts to overcharge the owner in setting 
the total amount due on a cost-plus-ten-per-
cent contract, the court does not abuse its 
discretion in refusing to award the contractor 
attorney fees in suit to collect upon such con-
tract. Shupe v. Menlove, 18 Utah 2d 130, 417 
R2d 246 (1966). 
Effect. 
This statute is mandatory, not discretionary. 
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38-1-7 LIENS 
materialman, and no such attachment, garnishment or levy upon any money 
due to a subcontractor or materialman from the contractor shall be valid as 
against any lien of a laborer employed by the day or piece. 
History: R.S. 1898 & CX- 1907, § 1380; 
CX. 1917, § 3730; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 52-
1-6. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 53 Am. Jur. 2d Mechanics' Garnishment of funds payable under build-
Liens § 265 ing and construction contract, 16 A L R 5th 
A.L.R. — Mechanic's hen based on contract 548. 
with vendor pending executory contract for sale 
of property as affecting purchaser's interest, 50 
A.L R.3d 944 
38-1-7. Notice of claim — Contents — Recording — Ser-
vice on owner of property. 
(1) A person claiming benefits under this chapter shall file for record with 
the county recorder of the county in which the property, or some part of the 
property, is situated, a written notice to hold and claim a lien within 90 days 
from the date: 
(a) the person last performed labor or service or last furnished equip-
ment or material on a project or improvement for a residence as defined in 
Section 38-11-102; or 
(b) of final completion of an original contract not involving a residence 
as defined in Section 38-11-102. 
(2) This notice shall contain a statement setting forth: 
(a) the name of the reputed owner if known or, if not known, the name 
of the record owner; 
(b) the name of the person by whom he was employed or to whom he 
furnished the equipment or material; 
(c) the time when the first and last labor or service was performed or the 
first and last equipment or material was furnished; 
(d) a description of the property, sufficient for identification; and 
(e) the signature of the lien claimant or his authorized agent and an 
acknowledgment or certificate as required under Title 57, Chapter 3, 
Recording of Documents. No acknowledgment or certificate is required for 
any notice filed after April 29, 1985, and before April 24, 1989. 
(3) Within 30 days after filing the notice of lien, the lien claimant shall 
deliver or mail by certified mail to either the reputed owner or record owner of 
the real property a copy of the notice of lien. If the record owner's current 
address is not readily available, the copy of the claim may be mailed to the 
last-known address of the record owner, using the names and addresses 
appearing on the last completed real property assessment rolls of the county 
where the affected property is located. Failure to deliver or mail the notice of 
lien to the reputed owner or record owner precludes the lien claimant from an 
award of costs and attorneys' fees against the reputed owner or record owner 
in an action to enforce the lien. 
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Rule 59 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 170 
collected through attachment proceeding, of an attorney against the proceeds of the judg-
Blake v. Farrell, 31 Utah 110, 86 P. 805 (1906). ment does not include his personal right to exe-
Vacation of satisfaction. cute against the judgment debtor. Utah C.V. 
The recorded satisfaction of judgment signed Fed. Credit Union v. Jenkins, 528 P.2d 1187 
by judgment creditor cannot be vacated with- (Utah 1974). 
out action and hearing in equity, and the lien 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 47 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments judgment against one joint tort-feasor as re-
§ 1004 et seq. lease of others, 40 A.L.R.3d 1181. 
C.J.S. — 49 C.J.S. Judgments §§ 574 to 584. Key Numbers. — Judgment *» 891 to 899. 
A.L.R. — Voluntary payment into court of 
Rule 59. New trials; amendments of judgment. 
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a new trial may be 
granted to all or any of the parties and on all or part of the issues, for any of 
the following causes; provided, however, that on a motion for a new trial in an 
action tried without a jury, the court may open the judgment if one has been 
entered, take additional testimony, amend findings of fact and conclusions of 
law or make new findings and conclusions, and direct the entry of a new 
judgment: 
(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or adverse party, 
or any order of the court, or abuse of discretion by which either party was 
prevented frorji having a fair trial. 
(2) Misconduct of the jury; and whenever any one or more of the jurors 
have been induced to assent to any general or special verdict, or to a 
finding on any question submitted to them by the court, by resort to a 
determination by chance or as a result of bribery, such misconduct may be 
proved by the affidavit of any one of the jurors. 
(3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have 
guarded against. 
(4) Newly discovered evidence, material for the party making the ap-
plication, which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered 
and produced at the trial. 
(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to have been given 
under the influence of passion or prejudice. 
(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision, 
or that it is against law. 
(7) Error in law. 
(b) Time for motion. A motion for a new trial shall be served not later 
than 10 days after the entry of the judgment. 
(c) Affidavits; time for filing. When the application for a new trial is 
made under Subdivision (a)(1), (2), (3), or (4), it shall be supported by affida-
vit. Whenever a motion for a new trial is based upon affidavits they shall be 
served with the motion. The opposing party has 10 days after such service 
within which to serve opposing affidavits. The time within which the affida-
vits or opposing affidavits shall be served may be extended for an additional 
period not exceeding 20 days either by the court for good cause shown or by 
the parties by written stipulation. The court may permit reply affidavits. 
(d) On initiative of court. Not later than 10 days after entry of judgment 
the court of its own initiative may order a new trial for any reason for which it 
might have granted a new trial on motion of a party, and in the order shall 
specify the grounds therefor. 
(e) Motion to alter or amend a judgment A motion to alter or amend the 
judgment shall be served not later than 10 days after entry of the judgment. 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to Juror's competency as witness as to validity 
Rule 59, F.R.C.P. of verdict or indictment, Rules of Evidence, 
Cross-References. — Harmless error not Rule 606. 
ground for new trial, Rule 61. 
Russell A. Cline (4298) 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
CRIPPEN & CLINE L.C. 
310 South Main Street Suite #120Q 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone (801) 539-1900 
Telefax (801) 322-1054 
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IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, 
J.V. HATCH CONSTRUCTION INC, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MICHAEL KAMPROS, 
Defendant. 
AMENDED JUDGMENT 
CIVIL NO. 950010438 
JUDGE: ROBERT K. HILDER 
This matter having been tried on August 12, 1996, September 
11, 1996, November 8, 1996 and December 3, 1996, and this Court 
having rendered it's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and 
having considered Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration of Award 
of Attorney's Fees and Costs and Plaintiff's Motion to Reopen Case, 
it is hereby ordered, adjudged and decreed that: 
1. Judgment is granted against Michael Kampros and in favor 
of J.V. Hatch Construction in the amount of $8,500, said amount to 
bear interest at 10% per annum from August 31, 1995 to the date 
hereof and thereafter at the applicable post judgment rate. 
2. J.V. Hatch Construction, Inc. is awarded judgment against 
Michael Kampros in the amount of $445.00 in costs said amount to 
bear judgment at the applicable post interest rate. 
3. Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration of Award of 
Attorney's Fees and Costs is granted. 
4. Plaintiff's Motion to Reopen Case is denied. 
5. It is hereby ordered that plaintiff's Mechanic's Lien 
filed on the property described on Exhibit A hereto shall be 
foreclosed and said property sold at sheriff's sale by the sheriff 
of Salt Lake County pursuant to Rule 69 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure to satisfy the foregoing debt. 
DATED this // day of November, 
Approved as to Form: 
Randy Ludlow 
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